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nary courts has not yet been dearly ruled upon, but a recent Supreme Court decision
seems to indicate that a higher standard may be required in reorganization proceed-
ings.33
Constitutional Law-Federal Power of Eminent Domain-[Federal].--Courts' and
commentators2 have generally3 agreed that the Constitution denies to federal agencies
all powers which are not specifically granted to the United States or which are not ap-
propriate for carrying into execution powers specifically granted to the United States.
It has thus been urged that the federal government may not constitutionally condemn
land for public purposes unless such condemnation may be justified as an exercise of
one or more of the powers vested in the federal government by the Constitution.4
In the recent cases of United States v. Diecknan,s United States v. Eighty Acres of
Land,6 and United States v. 458.95 Acres of Land,7 however, lower federal courts have
departed from the above analysis. In order to sustain the use of federal condemnation
to establish public recreational parkss and reforestation areas,9 they appear to have
argued that the federal government may constitutionally condemn land for any public
purpose. If this doctrine is to be accepted, it must be maintained that the federal emi-
nent domain power is a power, co-ordinate with, rather than resulting from, the powers
enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The instant cases rely most
strongly upon the cases of United States v. Threkeld,x" and Kohl v. United States." In
the Threkeld case the Supreme Court held that the power to condemn land for a railway
to be used to transport wood from a nationally owned forest resulted from the specified
federal power to dispose of and protect national property. The Kohl case maintained
that the power to condemn a postoffice site flowed from the grant of power to estab-
lish post-offices and post-roads. Assertions in the Kohl and other cases that the emi-
nent domain power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty" are accordingly rather
weak authority for the results in the principal cases.
In order to reconcile the results in the Dieckman, Eighty Acres of Land, and 483
Acres of Land cases with the position that the United States is a sovereignty with pow-
33 Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); see Pepper v. Litton, 7 U.S. Law
Week 639 (U.S. S. Ct. 1939).
x Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936); Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U.S. 46,
83, 87, 89 (i9o7); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, r Wheat. (U.S.) 304, 326 (i16).
'Willis, Constitutional Law 220 (1936); Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law 82 (1939).
3 For a different viewpoint, compare the Wilson-Roosevelt theory of constitutional powers
discussed in Willoughby, Constitutional Law 56-7 (2d students' ed. i93o).
4 See Kohl v. United States, 9r U.S. 367, 374 (1875).
s ioi F. (2d) 42X (C.C.A. 7th 1939).
6 26 F. Supp. 3,5 (Ill. 1939).
22 F. Supp. x017 (Pa. 1937).
' Cases cited in notes 5 and 7 supra.
9 United States v. Eighty Acres of Land, 26 F. Supp. 315 (Ill. x939).
o 72 F. (2d) 464 (C.C.A. ioth 1934); cf. Burley v. United States, 179 Fed. i (C.C.A. 9th.
19ip).
x" 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
2 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875); United States v. Lynah, i88 U.S.
445, 465 (1903).
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ers upon which there are limitations other than that legislation be for the general wel-
fare,X3 it is necessary to assume that use of the eminent domain power to establish
public recreational parks and reforestation projects is an appropriate means of exe-
cuting the federal power to spend for the general welfare. That the United States
might constitutionally purchase land to be used for recreation parks and reforestation
areas seems free from doubt14 inasmuch as the Supreme Court has asserted the Hamil-
tonian view that the federal government can 'expend funds in order to execute any
policy conducive to the common good.'s
Only commentators, however, have asserted that from the federal power to spend
funds for the general welfare there results a federal power to coerce the sale of prop-
erty. 6 Alt1iough the maintenance of such a view seems necessary if the instant cases
are to be reconciled with the position that the United States has only such powers as
are expressly or impliedly granted by the United States Constitution, the pertinence
of such a view is ignored by the instant cases. On the contrary, they only inquire
whether the objects sought to be attained constitute "public uses." A court should in
any case refuse to make this inquiry, which is relevant only to the question of whether
condemnation has been conducted in accord with the limitations upon federal power
imposed by the Fifth Amendment, unless it is satisfied that the condemnation chal-
lenged constitutes an exercise of a resulting federal power of eminent domain. If in a
given case it were held that the power to condemn results from the power to spend for
the general welfare, and that the purpose of the condemnation whose constitutionality
was in question was the advancement of the general welfare, the inquiry whether the
condemnation in question was for a public use should prove to be a mere formality
since it would be anomalous to hold both that land was to be devoted to the general
welfare and that it was to be dedicated to a non-public use.
Whether a federal power to coerce the sale of land should be regarded as resulting
from the federal power to spend for the general welfare is questionable. The Supreme
Court has implied the power to condemn the Gettysburg battlefield from an implied
federal power to establish military monuments, 7 the power to condemn land for ira-
X3 It is by no means certain, historitally, that the federal government was not intended to
have general power to provide for the general welfare. The evidence for this conclusion is,
however, beyond the scope of the present note.
'4 The two possible objections: that the project is local and is not open to an extended
public seem effectively disposed of by the following cases: Barnidge v. United States, ioi F.
(2d) 295 (C.C.A. 8th ig39); Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F. (2d) 323 (C.C.A. ioth 938);
United States v. Eighty Acres of Land, 26 F. Supp. 315 (Ill. 1939); Missouri Utilities Co. v.
California, 8 F. Supp. 454 (Mo. 1934); see Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 297
(1892), for strong dictum to the effect that land taken for a public park is taken for a public
use. But cf. UYnited States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, Ky., 78 F. (2d) 684 (C.C.A. 6th
1935); Washington Water Power Co. v. Coeur d'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263 (Idaho 1934).
is See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. z, 66 (3935). i Willoughby, Constitution of the
United States 97 (2d ed. i929); Burdick, Law of the American Constitution § 77 (i922);
Pomeroy, Constitutional Law 228-9 (gth ed. 1886). It may be argued, however, that the
holding in the Butler case is substantially a repudiation of the Hamilton view. If so, it is to
be doubted that the Supreme Court, as presently constituted, would reaffirm the Butler case.
z6Seak, Power of Federal Government to Condemn for Housing, i Law and Contemp.
Probs. 232 (1935); McGuire, The New Deal and the Public Money, 23 Georgetown LJ. T55,
179-88 (1935); Willis, Constitutional Law 722 (1936).
'7 United States v. Gettysburg Electric R., 16o U.S. 668 (1896).
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provement of navigation from the commerce power,'8 and the power to condemn lands
for post offices from the power to establish post offices and post roads.,9
The Court appears uniformly to have admitted, therefore, that if the purchase of a
parcel of land is an appropriate means of executing a federal power, condemnation of
the same parcel is also an appropriate means.20 It has been argued to the contrary,
however, that from the fact that the power to spend for the general welfare is unlim-
ited, it does not follow that there is any power to coerce sales. It has been urged, more-
over, that if federal agencies are permitted to employ eminent domain in aid of the
spending power, the federal government will be able to acquire extensive jurisdiction
over lands within the states and over the activities conducted thereon, thereby con-
verting Article I, Section 8 into something which most scholars have long since de-
cided that it is not, i.e., a general grant of power to provide for the general welfare.
The persuasiveness of this in terrorem argument should be weakened by a reminder
that judges could rely upon the never explicitly overruled Butler case,21 if they wished
to find that the Tenth Amendment constituted a barrier to extensive federal erosion of
state sovereignty. Moreover, no matter how extensive the scale of federal condemna-
tion,- the states will still retain a certain amount of jurisdiction over federally con-
demned lands which the states have not ceded to the federal government.23
While the Supreme Court has not been loathe to indicate the limits of most of the
enumerated powers such as the taxing power,24 and the commerce power,2s it has never
defined the limits of the spending power. Although the Court has never expressly so
stated, such reticence seems to rest upon the feeling that review of Congressional appro-
priation rests with the people at the polls, 6 or, perhaps more realistically, on the ground
1s Cherokee Nation v. Kansas R., 135 U.S. 641 (189o).
29 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
20 See ibid., at 371.
21 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1935); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20
(1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Contra: McCray v. United States, i95
U.S. 27 (I9O4); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (i99) (semble); Sonzinsky v. United
States, 3oo U.S. 506 (1937) (semble).
- That the federal government will attempt condemnation of a substantial percentage of
American land seems virtually fantastic. It should be remembered that "A tortured construc-
tion of the Constitution is not to be justified by recourse to extreme examples of reckless con-
gressional spending which might occur if courts could not prevent-expeditures which, even
if they could be thought to effect any national purpose, would be possible only by action of a
legislature lost to all sense of public responsibility. Such suppositions are addressed to the mind
accustomed to believe that it is the business of courts to sit in judgment on.the wisdom of legis-
lative action," United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. i, 87 (1935) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Stone). United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., Fed. Cas. No. 16114, at 686, 689 (I855)
illustrates the doubtful value of in terrorem arguments. In that case Justice McLean expressed
fear that if the power of the federal government to build internal roads under the commerce
power were admitted, the federal government could "make turnpike or railroads throughout
the entire country."
23 Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917). Fields, jurisdiction over
Nationally Owned Areas within the States, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 573 (1936).
24Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
2s Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Standard Oil Co. of Ky., 275 U.S. 257 (1927).
26 JCooley, Taxation §1I78,(4th ed. 1924).
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that courts are unqualified or unable to reverse legislative determinations of policies
conducive to the general welfare. Consistency would therefore require avoidance of
judicial review in those cases in which condemnation may be justified only as an exer-
cise of the spending power. How such avoidance of judicial review would be accom-
plished is a matter of conjecture. Perhaps the doctrines of "political question" or
"lack of sufficient pecuniary interest" used effectively in Massachusetts v. MellonW7
could be expanded to fit the eminent domain cases. Again the Court might say that
discretion belongs to Congress, unless "the choice is dearly wrong, a display of arbi-
trary power."'28 It has even been suggested that to effect such avoidance the Supreme
Court should refuse to pass upon the constitutionality of federal action.29
If the courts insist that the eminent domain function may not supplement the spend-
ing power, the federal government might still accomplish numerous ends similar to
those accomplished in the instant cases by conditioning the award of grants-in-aid
upon compliance by the states with terms dictated by federal administrators.3o
Damages-Mitigation of Compensatory Damages-[Georgia].-When threatened
with a suit for injury from the presence of a foreign substance in a bottle of Coca-Cola,
the defendant Coca-Cola Company procured the installation of a device in the plain-
tiff's hospital room which enabled the defendant's agents to listen to and record private
conversations between the plaintiff and her husband, doctors, nurses, and friends. The
plaintiff sued for invasion of her right of privacy. The defendant sought to justify its
conduct on the basis of its right to protect its property against the plaintiff's allegedly
false claim of damage. The court held that although the plaintiff's claim and threat-
ened suit did not justify the defendant's intrusion, the facts might be pleaded in mitiga-
tion of damages. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
It would seem that the court's refusal to allow the plaintiff's conduct to justify the
defendant's invasion is adequately supported by a strong social attitude against in-
vasions of privacy.2 The Georgia court's decision that mitigation be allowed was based
on a state statute precisely in point;3 however, a Wisconsin court has reached a con-
trary result under a statute permitting, in an action for libel or slander, use in mitiga-
27 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 28 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 61g, 640 (1936).
29 Nicholson, Federal Spending Power, 9 Temple L. Q. 3, 24 (r934). In the interest of
securing uniformity, it appears to be desirable that there be review by the federal judiciary
of the constitutionality of state legislation.
30 Missouri Utilities Co. v. California, 8 F. Supp. 454, 464 (Mo. 1934). Corwin, Spending
Power of Congress, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 548, 577 (X923).
z 2 S.E. (2d) 8io (Ga. App. 1939).
2 Conventional delineations of the rules guaranteeing privacy are broad and supported by
strong statements of policy. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(i8go); Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 Boston U. L. Rev. 353 (1932). Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o
, 
5o S.E. 68 (igo5); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225,37 S.W.
(2d) 46 (I93I).
Eavesdropping was an indictable nuisance at common law, 2 Wharton, Criminal Law § 1718
(12th ed. X932). In Georgia, at least, eavesdropping has been condemned by statute as well,
Ga. Code (z933) § 26-2OO.
3 Ga. Code (1933) § io5-i8o2: "Circumstances not amounting to justification may be plead-
ed in extenuation and mitigation of damages."
